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ABSTRACT 
J.S. Trimingham has famously described Ethiopia as a “beleaguered fortress in 
the midst of a sea of Islam,” implying Christians in Ethiopia have consistently been 
besieged by Muslims, not vice versa.  This thesis challenges this common conception by 
demonstrating that throughout Ethiopia’s medieval period (1270-1555), the time of 
greatest conflict between the Ethiopian Empire and its Muslim neighbors, Muslim forces 
did not besiege the Ethiopian Empire. On the contrary, the Ethiopians militarily 
subjugated their neighboring Muslim sultanates, most prominently Ifat and Adal, and 
politically divided the sultanates’ ruling families to keep them weak. These tactics, 
designed to wrest control of trade from the sultanates, were resoundingly successful until 
Muslims unified around military/religious leaders, primary among them being Imam 
Gran, who in 1531 conquered the Ethiopian Empire. Though Imperial forces reversed the 
conquest by 1543, a historical focus on this event still feeds the misperception that 
Ethiopia’s history is that of a Christian kingdom ensconced in a fortress to protect itself 
from a beleaguering “Muslim menace.” This thesis concludes to the contrary that the 
Ethiopian Empire waded aggressively and purposefully into the sea of Islam to beleaguer 
its many Muslim neighbors. 
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If you do even cursory internet research on Ethiopian history, it will not be long 
before you run across an oft-repeated description of Ethiopia as a place lost “in a sea of 
Islam.”1 This popular description of Ethiopia originates from J.S. Trimingham, an 
Orientalist historian who in 1969 described historic Ethiopia as “a beleaguered fortress in 
the midst of a sea of Islam.”2 Few claims in historical writing so succinctly encapsulate a 
vision of a centuries-old struggle in a single country. The word picture evokes a heroic 
vision of a besieged people struggling to avoid drowning in the midst of the rising tide of 
heretical power. Unfortunately, this powerful vision, as I argue in this thesis, greatly 
distorts the role Muslims played in Ethiopian history. The distortion occurs because 
Trimingham’s image suggests a fundamentally flawed conclusion: that the “beleaguered” 
Ethiopian Empire, comprised of Christian kingdoms in the Ethiopian highlands, was 
under constant siege by Muslim neighbors. This suggestion, however, is unsupported by 
the facts. I argue in this thesis that the Muslim neighbors of the Ethiopian Empire were 
besieged by Christian Ethiopia throughout the medieval period.  
My research is limited to Ethiopia’s medieval period (1270-1550).3 If there were 
ever a time when Trimingham’s word picture ought to hold up it would be in the 
medieval period, when specific Islamic forces did in fact at various times pose their 
greatest threat to the Christian Empire. The notion that the Christian Empire was 
beleaguered by its Muslim neighbors, however, turns out to be fundamentally flawed  
 
 
                                                 
1 See for example, Daniel Rempel, “Island of Christianity in a Sea of Islam,” November 21, 2002 by 
http://www.mennonitechurch.ca/news/releases/2002/11/11-21ethiopia.php (accessed May 7, 2008); 
“Ethiopia Religion,” Encyclopedia Britannica Online http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-37687/Ethiopia 
(accessed May 7, 2008). 
2 J. Spencer Trimingham, “The Expansion of Islam,” In Islam in Africa, edited by James Kritzeck, and 
William H. Lewis, New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold Company, 1969, 21. 
3 Richard Pankhurst, The Ethiopians: A History, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 1998, 
xiv, gives 1632 as the end date of the medieval period. For this thesis, however, it is unnecessary to take the 
historic review of this time period past the decade just after the defeat and death of the Muslim Imam Gran 
in 1543. 
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even when applied to the medieval period. Thus, I seek to answer the question: were 
Ethiopia’s Islamic neighbors a threat to the Empire or was the Empire actually a threat to 
its Islamic neighbors in the medieval period? 
A.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
To answer this question, I must first address in more detail the debate in the 
literature about the relations of Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia. The “standard work 
on the subject”4 remains Trimingham’s 297-page book Islam in Ethiopia, published in 
1952. In line with Edward Ullendorff’s The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and 
People published in 1960, Trimingham’s work articulates a view of Ethiopia as a 
Christian Empire historically facing a constant external threat in the form of the “Muslim 
menace.”5 In Islam in Ethiopia, Trimingham posits Ethiopia survived in spite of Islam 
and due in large part to the Christian people’s “national consciousness” rooted in 
Monophysite Christianity and Semitic tradition.6 Ullendorff simply dismisses the 
importance of Islamic influence in the region’s history by writing that “Islam can be 
disposed of very quickly… partly on account of its merely secondary importance to an 
understanding of the essential Abyssinia [Ethiopia]….”7 Trimingham and Ullendorff, 
writing in the Orientalist vein, set the stage for a generation of historians to reject Islam 
as an historically important factor in Ethiopia, other than as a violent menace to it. 
In 1992, Ahmed Hussein, published “The Historiography of Islam in Ethiopia” in 
the Journal of Islamic Studies challenging the Orientalist view of Islam in Ethiopia. 
Taking the Orientalists to task, he laid out a basic critique of the earlier literature on 
Ethiopian history, positing that “positive interactions between Muslim and Christian 
Ethiopians may well prove to have been of far greater importance than conflicts.”8 In 
                                                 
4 Hussein Ahmed, “The Historiography of Islam in Ethiopia,” Journal of Islamic Studies 3 (1992): 15. 
5 J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1952, 84; see also Asa J. 
Davis, “The Sixteenth Century Jihad in Ethiopia and the Impact on its Culture (Part I),” Journal of the 
Historical Society of Nigeria 2 (1963): 567-92.  
6 Trimingham, 1952: 142-45.  
7 Edward Ullendorff, The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960, 113 (emphasis added).  
8 Ahmed, 1992: 18. 
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addition, he argued that “Islam cannot be seen as a historical force external to Ethiopia” 
but that it has been “an integral part of the Ethiopian culture.”9 He identified a 
“historiographical prejudice” that places Christianity at the core of all historical analysis 
of Ethiopia and Islam on the periphery (recalling Trimingham’s statement that “Islam in 
the region is not significant in itself but only in relation to the history of the Christian 
state….”).10 Ahmad argued that older research on Islam ignores the presence of 
indigenous Muslims in medieval Ethiopia. Medieval Ethiopia was an empire made up of 
several Christian kingdoms, each of which sought autonomy. Throughout the medieval 
period, however, these kingdoms generally recognized the Empire, under the Solomonic 
Dynasty, as sovereign and consolidated their people under the Solomonic banner when 
unity was needed. The older research tells only the story of these Christian kingdoms and 
their efforts at consolidation, leaving out the story of the Muslims who lived and worked 
in these “Christian kingdoms.” Ahmad also criticizes the monolithic view of Islam in 
Ethiopia in that historians of Ethiopia have failed to distinguish between “the political, 
often expansionist, manifestations of external Islam on the one hand, and indigenous 
Islam which is part of the Ethiopian culture on the other.”11  
Finally, Ahmed lays out a series of questions for future research. In 2001, Ahmed 
himself addressed some of these questions in an in-depth examination of 19th century 
Wallo, Ethiopia.12 Subsequent to Ahmed’s writings, others have challenged the views 
Ahmad criticized.13 Haggai Erlich has aided in the corrective effort presenting facts about 
Islamic powers that interacted with Ethiopia and their efforts at cooperation with 
Ethiopia. In 1994, 2002 and 2007, Erlich published books on Ethiopia’s relations with the 
Middle East generally, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt, respectively, addressing relations 
                                                 
9 Ahmed, 1992: 18. 
10 Ibid; Trimingham, 1969, 21. 
11 Ahmed, 1992: 45-46. 
12 Hussein Ahmed, Islam in Nineteenth-Century Wallo, Ethiopia: Revival, Reform and Reactionm 
Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2001. 
13 John L. Esposito, The Oxford History of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; Harold 
Marcus, A History of Ethiopia: Updated Ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002; Paul Henze B. 
Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia, New York: Palgrave, 2000. 
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between Ethiopian Islamic communities and the Muslim world at large. 14 Some authors 
have challenged the Orientalist view of Islam as an outside invader. Kapteijns, for 
example, argues that the sixteenth century ‘Islamic conquest,’ was not an external 
invasion, but a ‘civil war’ waged by indigenous Muslims.15 Esposito lays responsibility 
for the sixteenth century Muslim “invasion” of Ethiopia at the feet of Christian 
expansionists.16 These authors, however, have only lightly touched on the topic with no 
in-depth narrative laying out the facts that would respond to the notion of a perennial 
Muslim menace to the Ethiopian Empire. Other authors have also begun taking a more 
open view of Islamic influence in their written general histories of Ethiopia. In The 
Ethiopians: A History, for example, Pankhurst provides a thorough general history across 
time that presents facts showing the interdependence, as well as conflicts, between 
Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia.17 While Pankhurst’s book, like other general 
histories of high quality, presents many facts relevant to this thesis, the book only lays 
out the facts. Pankhurst’s history and other histories like it do not cull the facts to address 
head on this misguided notion that Ethiopia’s Islamic neighbors were a constant threat to 
Ethiopia.   
Accordingly, a gap exists in the literature on Ethiopia in that, first, the written 
histories do not focus their aim at collecting and analyzing evidence of the nature of 
Muslim-Christian interactions in the medieval period and, second, none of them are 
written to address the nature of the relationship of Ethiopia and its Christian neighbors. I 
hope to make a contribution to filling that gap. This thesis seeks to address the 
relationship between Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia during the medieval period, at 
the time of their worst conflicts, as well as their greatest cooperation.  
                                                 
14 Haggai Erlich, Ethiopia and the Middle East, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994; Haggai 
Erlich, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007; Haggai Erlich, The Cross 
and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt and the Nile, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. 
15 David Robinson, Muslim Societies in African History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 
16 Lidwien Kapteijns, “Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa,” in The History of Islam in Africa edited by 
Nehemia Levtzion, and Randall L. Pouwels, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000. 
17 Pankhurst, 1998. 
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B.  METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will primarily consist of a historical narrative constructed by 
reexamining pre-199018 historical literature in light of facts and arguments published 
since 1990. No primary sources or original evidence will be presented. Instead, the 
narrative seeks to eliminate bias and assign the appropriate weight to evidence that has 
long been recognized, but systematically underemphasized, to arrive at a balanced 
assessment of the multifaceted and sometimes contradictory effects of forces of Islam in 
medieval Ethiopian history.  
C.  OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
In this Introductory Chapter I, I have laid out my basic challenge to the “sea of 
Islam” conception and stated my research question. In Chapter II, I address the pre-
medieval period in Ethiopia, sketching the arrival of Christianity and Islam. I provide a 
brief overview of the pre-medieval period to explain how Muslim and Christian 
relationships and their spheres of influence took shape just prior to the medieval period. I 
introduce the reader to the geographic area under consideration to establish the 
geographic religious make-up of Ethiopia on the eve of the medieval period and most 
importantly to establish the development of the Muslim-controlled trade routes that were 
the source of the conflicts between the Ethiopian Empire and its Muslim neighbors 
throughout the medieval period. This is necessary to show that the conflicts were the 
result of aggressive, expansionary policies of the Ethiopian Empire, not the result of 
aggression by the Empire’s Muslim neighbors.   
In contrast to Chapter II’s more general background on the pre-medieval period, 
Chapter III provides an in-depth historical narrative of the medieval period in the form of 
a time line of Ethiopian history that details the rule of several important Christian rulers 
of the Solomonic dynasty. To the extent possible based on my secondary sources, I also 
                                                 
18 Beginning around 1990, the literature began constructively calling for a reexamination of previous 
conclusions drawn about Islam’s influence in Ethiopia. (See Ahmed, 1992). The point about imbalance in 
coverage of the Muslim-Christian relation had been made before for example in Braukamper, Ulrich. 
Islamic History and Culture in Southern Ethiopia: Collected Essays. Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2002: 152. (The 
particular essay was originally published in the 1984.) 
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detail the rule of Sultans that interacted with the Solomonic dynasty. In this narrative, I 
directly address the questions posed in this thesis by detailing cooperation between 
Muslims and Christians and the causes of conflict. In terms of cooperation, I will show 
the evolution of interdependence via trade between the Solomonic Empire and its Muslim 
neighbors. This narrative will correct existing narratives by interweaving relevant facts, 
previously downplayed, that show that the relationship between Christians and Muslims 
was often cooperative and interdependent, becoming violent for the most part only at 
times when the Christian forces of the Solomonic Empire were expanding into Muslim 
territory and attempting to take control of trade and/or territory from several of the 
Muslim sultanates south and east of Ethiopia. Overall, this collection of evidence will 
demonstrate how the paradigm of a “beleaguered [Ethiopian] fortress in a sea of Islam” 
sinks under a tide of evidence. In Chapter IV, I offer conclusions based on this corrected 
narrative. 
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II. ETHIOPIAN RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE 
ROUTES ON THE EVE OF THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD  
Despite descriptions of Ethiopia as a ‘beleaguered Christian fortress,’ a review of 
the medieval period will show that in actuality the Christian Emperors in medieval 
Ethiopia were besieging their Islamic neighbors, infringing upon their territory often 
resulting in brutal conflicts. The root cause of these conflicts was not religion but the 
Ethiopian desire to wrest control of trade routes from their Islamic neighbors.19 In this 
section of the thesis, I lay out how Ethiopia came to share borders with several Muslim 
polities in the pre-medieval period so the reader can see how Christian expansion in the 
medieval period infringed on Muslim territory. Additionally, I discuss how trade 
developed in the region prior to the medieval period in order to show how trade cemented 
mutual dependence between Christian and Muslim polities but also became the central 
cause behind Ethiopian expansion in the medieval period.  
A.  ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY’S ARRIVAL IN ETHIOPIA  
While Islamic contacts with Ethiopia can be traced to the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad, Islam truly came to Ethiopia to stay around the 8th century C.E when 
Islamic traders from the Dahlak Islands, located in the Red Sea off the coast of modern-
day Eritrea (see Figure 2), began moving into the Ethiopian hinterland.20 Muslim settlers 
primarily from Yemen and the Hadrawmat, in the southern Arabian Peninsula, also 
migrated to the Red Sea coast of today’s Eritrea creating an “Islamic strip” along the 
Horn of Africa’s Red Sea coast.21 Sometime between the eighth and tenth centuries, these 
                                                 
19 Tamrat, 1972: 80; Esposito, 501; see also James Currey, General History of Africa, Africa from the 
Seventh to the Eleventh Century, Berkeley: University of California Press (1992): 281-282 (explaining that 
“[s]ince the commercial route through the Nile Valley had been closed to Christian Ethiopia and the sea 
route to India had been reduced to a minimum, because of the consolidation and extension of Muslim 
control, the Christian kingdom was compelled to seek its expansion southwards, towards the centre of the 
Ethiopian plateau.”) 
20 Kapteijns, 228; Esposito, 501-03; Erlich, 1994: 5-6; Braukamper, 2002: 5; Robinson, 112. 
21 Ullendorff, 51; Martin, B.G. “Mahdism, Muslim Clerics, and Holy Wars in Ethiopia, 1300-1600,” 
In Proceedings of the First United States Conference on Ethiopian Studies, edited by H. Marcus, 91-100. 
East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1975: 91 (quoting Alawi bin Tahir al-Haddad, Al-Madkhal ila 
ta’rikh al-Islam bi’l-Sharq al-Aqsa (Cairo: 1391/1971), 23.). 
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settlers established a sultanate around the Somali port of Mogadishu.22 The Muslim 
traders spread from there and the Dahlak Islands into the hinterland from about the ninth 
century C.E.  
The Muslim settlement of the Islamic strip was preceded by the arrival of 
Christianity, which first came to the ancient city-state of Aksum in the fourth century 
C.E.23 Aksum (identified as “Aksumite Ethiopia” in Figure 1) contracted over time and in 
the first half of the twelfth century came to be ruled by the Zagwe dynasty.24 See Figure 1. 
                                                 
22 Esposito, 501. 
23 Trim, 1952: 40; Abraham Demoz, “The Many Worlds of Ethiopia,” African Affairs 68 (1969): 49; 
Erlich, 1994: 3.  
24 Tamrat, 1972: 54. 
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Figure 1.   Contraction and Growth of Ethiopia in History25 
Around 1270 C.E., Amharan forces led by Emperor Yekuno Amlak (ruled 1270-
1285) killed the last Zagwean ruler of Ethiopia. Emperor Amlak declared himself 
Ethiopia’s ruler, revived the Solomonic dynasty, and effectively began Ethiopia’s  
 
 
                                                 
25 Erlich, 1994: x. 
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medieval period.26 Figure 2 shows that at the outset of the medieval period, Emperor 
Amlak’s Ethiopia was a conglomeration of Christian kingdoms, principally Amhara, 
Lasta and Tigrai bordered on the east and south by Muslim territories. 
 
Figure 2.   Christian Territories in the Ethiopian Highlands up to the Medieval Period27 
Emperor Amlak’s Empire was Christian, based ultimately on a legendary marriage 
between Queen Sheba of Ethiopia and the Jewish King Solomon.28 During the early 
                                                 
26 Demoz, 50. 
27 Tamrat, 1972: 54. 
28 Ibid. 
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medieval period, under the reign of Emperor Amda Seyon (r. 1314-1344), the Ethiopian 
Empire expanded to encompass a growing number of non-Christian regions. This 
expansion into Muslim territory is what led to conflict, not Muslim attacks on the 
Christian kingdoms. The following section explains in more detail the location of these 
Islamic sultanates vis-à-vis the Christian kingdoms. 
B.  GEOGRAPHY OF THE ISLAMIC SULTANATES AND CHRISTIAN 
KINGDOMS 
Figure 3 is a diagram of where the Christian and Muslim areas were primarily 
located from the outset of the medieval period to the mid-14th century.   
 
Figure 3.   Muslim Areas in Early Medieval Ethiopia29 
                                                 
29 Trimingham, 1952: 64. 
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Many of these “Muslim areas” were “beleaguered” by the Christian Emperors in the 
medieval period. These Muslim sultanates are presented in more detail in Figure 4, which 
also shows how the area of Christian control had shifted south and east between 1270 and 
1344 (compare Figure 2).30 
 





                                                 
30 Pankhurst, 1998: Map 1. 
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In Figure 4, the “Areas under Christian control” marked in white include several 
previously Muslim controlled principalities in the south: Ifat, Fatagar, Hadeya, Dawaro, 
Sharka, Bali and southern Shawa.31 The religious composition of Ganz, just north of 
Hadeya, is far from clear but it certainly contained Muslim inhabitants though Christian 
influence would predominate over Islamic influence in Ganz later in the medieval 
period.32 As discussed in detail later, the Ethiopian Emperor Amda Seyon took control of 
these Muslim territories to his south during his reign from 1314-1344. Ethiopian 
Emperors thereafter continued pressing eastward (see Figure 4) resulting in more conflict 
with the Muslim sultans. Since Shawa was an important area of Christian control, it is of 
note that while I have marked Shawa in Figure 4 as a “Muslim area,” the story of Shawa 
is more complicated. At least part of Shawa had a pre-medieval history of Muslim 
control. Over time Muslim control faded to the point that during the early medieval 
period the Ethiopian Empire controlled most of Shawa while the Sultanate of Ifat, 
adjacent to Shawa, controlled a small portion of eastern Shawa.33 An understanding of 
the location of these principalities is important since the history of the medieval period is 
a long story of Christian efforts to move southward from Shawa and eastward (see Figure 
4) in an effort to gain control of trade routes that ran through these Muslim principalities. 
C.  THE MAJOR TRADE ROUTES 
Figure 5 represents the trade routes that ran through Ethiopia at the outset of the 
medieval period. These routes extended south and west from the coast beginning with the 
pre-medieval arrival of Islamic traders described earlier. By the beginning of the 
                                                 
31 According to G.W.B. Huntingford The Historical Geography of Ethiopia from the First Century 
AD to 1704. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989: 86, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, “In 
addition to the provinces directly under the jurisdiction of the king, a number of other areas were tributary 
to the king but under his own rulers… Waj, Ganz, Hadeya, Bali, Dawaro, Fatagar, Ifat, Geddem, Angot, 
Agaw, Gozzam (Gojjam), Gafat, and Damot.”; Braukamper, Islamic Principalities 40 (“Although the 
dominating influence of the territory was undoubtedly Christian, a more or less intensive Muslim 
infiltration cannot be excluded because of its exposed situation on the frontier of Adal. A general 
characterization as ‘one of the Muslim states’ [citing Beckingham and Huntingford 1954] cannot, however, 
be accepted.”). 
32 Braukamper, 2002: 47-49. 
33 Ibid., 19-20 (see also 135 for an example of the difficulty in deciphering the geography of the 
region: “the ancient state of Bali… must not be confused in geographical size with the Ethiopian province 
of that name.”) 
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medieval period, the routes had been developed to the point Figure 5 illustrates. The 
routes in Figure 5 would remain active throughout the medieval period becoming the 
primary source of conflict.34 
 
Figure 5.   Trade Routes in Medieval Ethiopia (1332-1527) 
Trade routes originated around the Dahlak Islands and the Port of Zeila, both of 
which were areas of Muslim control (see Figure 1). The trade routes then snaked through 
the heart of the territory the Christians sought to control in the 14th century. Emperor 
Seyon took control of Bali, Dawaro, Hadeya and Ifat, all Muslim areas that Figure 5 
illustrates he clearly needed to control in order to control trade. 
                                                 
34 Tamrat, 1972: 81. 
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In medieval Ethiopia, Muslims traders controlled several important trade 
commodities including rock salt, slaves, ivory and cloth.35 Rock salt was a form of 
primitive money that made exchange of goods easier in an otherwise barter-based 
economy, and it was highly prized in the Empire as it could only be obtained at some 
distance in the difficult Afar/Dankali depression region east of Tigrai and only with great 
difficulty due to its weight and relative fragility. Ethiopia often traded slaves, which 
brought high prices in the Near and Middle East, for rock salt.36 Most slaves came from 
the pagan/“traditional religion” areas to the west of the Ethiopian Empire seen in Figures 
2, 4 and 5.37 After the long transport to these slave-producing regions, two or three 
blocks of rock salt could sometimes be exchanged for one good slave.38 The Ethiopian 
Emperors and Muslim merchants and their local partners sold many slaves after taking 
them captive in their various raids in these frontier areas.39 The trade of slaves and rock 
salt formed an essential part of Muslim trade in the Ethiopian region.40 However, the 
Ethiopian Emperors also ruled valleys that were rich in wildlife, including elephants. The 
Emperors’ forces systematically hunted elephants, removed their tusks and exchanged the 
ivory for luxury items like jewels, gold and other precious metals brought by Muslim 
traders from India, Egypt, Greece and Rome.41 Controlling trade so as to tax it became a 
central goal of the Ethiopian Emperor Amda Seyon at the outset of the medieval period.42  
The Ethiopian Empire did not, however, simply seek to take over all aspects of 
trade. For example, they wanted the Muslims to continue to handle certain elements of 
                                                 
35 Tamrat, 1972: 85; Richard Pankhust, The Ethiopian Borderlands: Essays in Regional History from 
Ancient Times to the End of the 18th Century, Ethiopia: The Red Sea Press, 1997: 25. 
36 Pankhurst, 1998: 70.  
37 Tamrat, 1972: 85. 
38 Pankhurst, 1997, 108. 
39 Tamrat, 1972: 85. 
40 Pankhurst, 1998: 70. 
41 Tamrat, 1972: 88. 
42 Ibid., 80. 
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production for trade.43 Ethiopian society drew a sharp distinction between artisans and 
crafts workers. Artisans assisted in the building of elaborate churches and were respected. 
In contrast, crafts workers engaged in occupations such as pottery making, leather 
tanning, carpentry, and blacksmithing were despised and regarded by Christians as 
possessing the ‘evil eye.’44 Despite this, Christians wanted Muslim craftsmen to make 
such items as cloth used as wraps, which served as another type of primitive currency. 
Only the Muslims had both cotton from the hot, arid lowland Islamic strip, and only 
Muslims were willing to work in the despised occupation of weavers.45  The Ethiopian 
rulers thus bought such weaved commodities from Muslims, as well as silk, linen and 
carpets from foreign countries via Muslim traders.46 Blacksmiths, another despised 
occupation, worked with thin bars of iron, another form of primitive money because it 
could be melted and shaped into tools.47 Rather than fostering craftwork in the highlands 
then, leaving the production of these good to Muslims made sense.  
Thus on the eve of the medieval period, Muslims principalities were in place to 
the south and east of the Ethiopian Christian kingdoms. These Muslim principalities 
controlled substantial trade routes of which the Ethiopians had by this time made long, 
consistent and substantial use. As we shall see in the next chapter, Emperor Amda 
Seyon’s efforts to control trade by invading Muslim-controlled areas to his south and east 
would result in considerable conflict with the neighboring Muslim principalities. Rather 
than the Christian Emperor hunkering down in some beleaguered fortress, he and his 
armies would actually lay siege to their multiple Muslim neighbors. 
                                                 
43 Abir, Mordechai. “Trade and Christian-Muslim Relations in Post-Medieval Ethiopia,” In 
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Ethiopian Studies, edited by R. L. Hess, 411-414, 
Chicago: Office of Publication Services, 1978: 412. 
44 M.E. Heldman “Fre Seyon: A Fifteenth-Century Ethiopian Painter,” African Arts 31 (1998): 48. 
45 Pankhurst, 1998: 70. 
46 Abussamad Ahmad, “The Gondar Muslim Minority in Ethiopia,” Journal of the Institute of Muslim 
Minority Affairs 9 (1988): 76. 
47 Pankhurst, 1998: 70. 
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III. ETHIOPIAN EXPANSION OVER MUSLIM TERRITORY AND 
TRADE ROUTES (1270-1550) 
A.  THE CHRISTIAN EMPIRE AND THE SULTANATE OF IFAT 
In this section, I discuss how in the early decades of the medieval period, the 
Ethiopian Empire expanded southward and eastward from Shawa over several Islamic 
principalities including most importantly the Sultanate of Ifat. As we shall see, the 
geographic area into which the Empire expanded coincided directly with the areas of 
Muslim-controlled trade routes allowing the Empire to wrest a great deal of control over 
these routes from Muslim principalities. While expansion over several of these Muslim 
principalities would be relatively peaceful, Emperor Amda Seyon would encounter stiff 
resistance from Sultan Haqq ad-Dinn of Ifat. Ultimately, however, Emperor Seyon would 
violently subjugate Ifat, reducing it from an independent sultanate to a provincial 
governate by 1411, but not before Emperor Seyon had forced a split in Sultan Haqq ad-
Dinn’s family, the Walashma, who ruled Ifat. The more militant elements of the 
Walashma family would flee east from Ifat and set up the Sultanate of Adal, which would 
serve as the principal counterweight to further Ethiopian expansionary ambitions. 
In 1270, the Christian leader Yekuno Amlak removed the Zagwean king, declared 
himself Emperor and reestablished the Solomonid dynasty in Amhara and Shawa in the 
Ethiopian highlands (see Figure 4 at the center).48 The revival of the Solomonic Empire 
was aided by a revival of religious fervor, which in turn would aid the Christian 
Emperor’s expansionary goals. Thanks to a legendary history dating back to Jerusalem 
and Solomon, the Ethiopian Emperor saw Ethiopians as the “chosen people” of God. The 
power of this Solomonic legend invigorated the Ethiopian state and Christian church by 
confirming Christianity as integral to the dynasty’s success. The spread of these beliefs 
also gave an impetus to the southward expansion of the Christian kings, as the Christian  
 
                                                 
48 Sergew Hable Sellassie, Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian History to 1270, Addis Ababa: Addis 
Ababa United Printers, 1972: 283; Otto F.A. Meinardus, Christian Egypt: Faith and Life, Cairo: The 
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Emperor’s Chroniclers began comparing Muslim leaders not under control of the 
Christian Empire with unrighteous and defeated enemies from scripture, for example 
Goliath, Pharaoh, Judas and Satan.49   
The essential Ethiopian expansionary conflict in the early fourteenth century was 
waged between Ethiopian Emperor Amda Seyon (r. 1314-44), the leader of the 
Solomonic dynasty, and Sultan Haqq ad Din of Ifat located on the Christian Empire’s 
eastern border. Emperor Seyon had worked to consolidate his Empire internally and to 
gain considerable ground to his east as can be seen by comparing Figures 2 (pre-1270) 
and 4 (post-1270).50 As he consolidated his imperial control, his economy grew, as did 
his desire for control of the Muslim-dominated trade routes.51 Without violence, Seyon 
began bringing Muslim communities to his south under his suzerainty. To avoid Imperial 
harassment, these Islamic principalities were required to recognize his suzerainty, pay 
taxes on trade and conform to his administration.52 It is not clear from the literature 
exactly which Muslim provinces peacefully entered into this accommodation of Christian 
control. What is clear, however, is that Sultan Haqq ad-Din of Ifat, resisted. Like their 
Christian counterparts, Muslims of Ifat conducted raids on neighboring areas grabbing 
loot and disappearing back across the desert. Some of these raids occurred in Seyon’s 
areas of control, but because of their ephemeral nature did not pose a serious threat to the 
Empire. They also harassed some trading caravans again posing no serious threat to the 
Empire. Nevertheless, Emperor Seyon’s chronicles report that in the early 1320’s, Seyon 
complained to Sultan Haqq that a Christian mission he had sent to Cairo via the coast had 
been seized by one of Sultan Haqq’s subjects and tortured.53 Seyon then launched a  
 
                                                 
49 Marcus, 18; John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007, 61; Pankhurst, 1998: 57. 
50 Donald Crummey, Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia, Chicago: University of 
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major expedition against Ifat,54 sacking the capital and eventually killing Haqq ad-Din.55 
He then attacked and looted other Muslim principalities including Hadeya in the south 
and Damot in the west (see Figure 456) breaking ties they had with Ifat. Ifat and these 
other Islamic principalities accepted Seyon’s suzerainty and agreed to pay tribute in 
return for maintaining their autonomy.57 Thereafter, conflict occurred between the forces 
of Emperor Seyon and Haqq-ad-Din’s son, Darader.58 Ifat was conquered, Emperor 
Seyon established garrisons in the region, and thereby gained control of the major trade 
routes though he did not control the Dahlak Islands to his north or the Port of Zeila 
(Zayla) and Adal to his east (see Figure 4).59 This conquest began a series of battles 
between the Ethiopian Christian kingdoms and their Muslim neighbors that lasted until 
the end of the medieval period. 
Within ten years of its conquest, Haqq ad-Din’s brother, Amir Sabr ad-Din 
(“Sabradin”), assumed power in Ifat, and rallied the Muslim population, which had 
already grown tired of paying the Emperor’s heavy taxes while seeing nothing but 
neglect in return.60 Ifat did not share Ethiopian traditions or the feeling of national unity 
that many of the non-Muslim states had, and thus the rebellion met little internal 
resistance.61 Around 1332, Sabradin’s supporters resumed harassing the Emperors 
caravans making their way to the Red Sea.62  
Ifat was not alone in rebelling. Amda Seyon spent considerable war materiel in 
this period suppressing rebellions in other parts of his empire, including Tigrai, Damot, 
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Dawaro and Hadeya, giving Sabradin time to rebuild his army.63 While the Solomonid 
chronicles, a clearly biased source,64 claim that Sabradin was planning to invade and 
permanently occupy the Christian highlands, Amda Seyon in fact made the first move.65 
To prevent Hadeya (See Figure 3) from reestablishing ties with Ifat, he sent troops into 
Hadeya, leading Sabradin to mount an invasion of Angot, Amhara and Shawa highlands 
in response (see Figure 4 at the middle of the eastern border of the “Areas under Christian 
control”).66 The rebellious Muslim forces were all routed. Sabradin surrendered along 
with the Sultans of Dawaro and Hadeya. Despite his victory, Emperor Seyon did not 
replace the ruler of Ifat with an Ethiopian governor. Instead, he appointed Sabradin’s 
brother, Jamal ad-Din, to rule Ifat.67   
Had Emperor Seyon actually been defending himself against an advancing 
Muslim menace, he might have been expected to stop his advance at this point. Indeed, 
Jamal ad-Din promised the Muslims of the region would return to peaceful trading 
relations if Emperor Seyon would end his advance.68 Seyon did not stop though. Instead, 
he pressed further east in Muslim territory, even though many of his troops were dying of 
disease or deserting.69 To forestall Emperor Seyon’s invasion of their territories, the 
Muslim leaders of Adal and Mora (both located to the east of Ifat), who had stayed out of 
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the fight until this point, attacked Seyon’s forces.70 (As we shall see these areas east of 
Ifat would continue to be the target of Christian expansion as the medieval period wore 
on.) Amda Seyon marched on to Mora and Adal and the Afar country, the most distant 
campaign any Ethiopian ruler had yet undertaken.71 By the end of his assault in 1332, 
Emperor Seyon had broken the rebellion in Ifat, sacked Ifat’s capital, and menaced Adal, 
a harbinger of battles to come in the medieval period. He had also forcefully brought the 
Muslim sultanates of Hadeya and Dawaro back under control.72  
Figure 4 shows the Muslim areas under Emperor Seyon’s control at the end of his 
reign in 1342. In these areas, the Emperor now had ultimate authority over which heir 
would rule.73 By maintaining this control over successors, he was able to create 
competing factions within the Muslim leadership as various leaders sought his blessing 
over their ascension to power. He thereby divided the Muslim leaders in order to rule 
them.74 Thus it was that Emperor Seyon’s son Sayfa Ar’ad (r. 1342-70) inherited Muslim 
factions on his frontier. On one hand, his weakened Muslim neighbors did continue to 
rebel including one rebellion that required Ar’ad to send 30,000 troops into Ifat.75 On the 
other hand, Muslim traders and merchants preferred peace to conflict.76 Thus, some 
seventy-five years now into the medieval period, we see a reality of divided, ineffectual 
Muslim leadership and Muslim traders’ inclined to peace, a reality that lends no support 
to the traditional image of the Christian Empire as a fortress beleaguered by its neighbors. 
Like his father, Emperor Ar’ad kept the rulers of Ifat weak. He even sought to 
incorporate Ifat completely into his administration, which led to a split within Ifat’s 
ruling family between militant elements who wanted independence from the Emperor’s 
rule and those more concerned with improving commerce.77 The independence-minded 
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elements moved east and founded the Sultanate of Adal (see Figure 5) in the region of 
Harar, a region that had been Islamized at least since the thirteenth century.78  This 
removed them from the immediate threat of the Ethiopian Emperor. Thus, Ifat was 
eventually reduced to a provincial governorate of the Solomonic Empire, diminished by 
Ethiopian expansion and the internal rivalries fostered by the Ethiopian Emperor.79  
During the short reign of Sayfa Ar’ad’s eldest son Niwaya-Maryam (1371-81), 
the Emperor’s forces killed the rebellious Sultan Haqq-ad-Din II in battle.80 His brother 
Sa’ad-ad-Din then came to rule Adal as the next Ethiopian Emperor, Dawit I (1382-
1411), took power. Under Sa’ad-ad-Din’s rule, Muslims from Adal conducted raids 
across the eastern border of Dawit’s territory. Like Christian raiders elsewhere, these 
raiders would steal or recover cattle and slaves and then return across the desert.81 There 
is no indication these raids posed any serious threat to the Solomonic Empire, or even 
that raids into Ethiopian territory were more common than raids from Ethiopian territory. 
Nevertheless, Dawit I responded in 1403 with a brutal expedition that pursued Sa’ad-ad-
Din all the way to Zeila at the coast (see Figure 5), captured him, killed him and then 
sacked the port town.82 This expedition took the Ethiopian leader to the most easterly 
point ever reached by the Solomonic empire and for the first time put the trade routes of 
Adal (see Figure 5) and the Muslim Port of Zeila (see Figure 5) at risk of Christian 
conquest.83 This expedition capped a succession of humiliating defeats for multiple 
Muslim provinces and brought Muslim power in the region to its lowest ebb.  
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Thus, by the beginning of the 15th century the Ethiopian Empire had gained 
control of virtually all the trade routes shown in Figure 5. It had not yet, however, taken 
the Dahlak Islands or the more important Port of Zeila or the trade routes running through 
Adal. This expansion had begun with the Emperor’s success in splitting the ruling 
Walashma family of Ifat, thereby facilitating its defeated. However, the splitting of the 
Walashma family created a new problem for Ethiopia: the development of a new, even 
more independence-minded Sultanate of Adal. 
B.  THE CHRISTIAN EMPIRE, THE SULTANATE OF ADAL, AND THE 
MUSLIM PORTS 
Sultan Ahmad Badlay, of the Walashma family, took the reins of power in Adal in 
1432 (r. 1432-1445), and a year later Emperor Zara Yakob (r. 1433-1468) took the throne 
of the Ethiopian Empire.84 Sultan Badlay’s area of control roughly covered the Afar plain 
(see Figure 3), a large area extending from Sawakin on the coast north of Tigrai down to 
the mountains at Shawa and east across Harar and the port at Zeila into part of Somali-
occupied territory.85  Since the Muslim defeats a couple decades earlier, Sultan Badlay 
had successfully recovered significant control of the trade routes between several of the 
Muslim provinces, namely Ifat, Fatagar, Dawaro, and Bali, and the coast of Zeila (see 
Figure 4 in the south of the “Areas under Christian control).86 The supposedly 
beleaguered Christians nevertheless continued military campaigns against permanent 
settlements in these areas and in Adal itself. This ceaseless violence finally drove the 
mercantile and agricultural communities of these Muslim regions to unify with the 
militant elements of Adal.87 In addition, the name Somali first appears in Ethiopian 
documents around this time because Adal began to draw on Somali fighting power.88 
(The mobilization of Somali forces would prove a key to Imam Gran’s later conquest of 
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the Ethiopian Empire.) To weaken the Emperor’s hold on Muslim territories, Sultan 
Badlay’s forces would wage intermittent but punishing guerilla warfare, in cooperation 
with the locals of those territories, against Emperor Yakob’s garrisons from 1443-1445. 
89 In 1445 Emperor Yakob responded by sending a force large enough to defeat Badlay 
into Adal, breaking the will of the Adalite army. Though defeated, Adal was allowed to 
continue under Muslim leadership, being far too large and inhospitable for the Christians 
to control. Adal was, however, made to pay a heavy tribute.  
After the war the Emperor and the Sultan appeared to go about their business for 
fear of further disrupting trade.90 Emperor Yakob, however, had not given up the historic 
Ethiopian desire for full seaport access. Instead of focusing on the distant Port of Zeila, as 
had his predecessors, he turned his attention north to the Dahlak Islands and the adjacent 
coastal area of Massawa (see Figure 3 on the Red Sea coast). The rulers of the Dahlak 
Islands had embraced Islam centuries before and by Yakob’s time maintained significant 
relations with Baghdad, the center of the Ottoman Empire.91 In 1448-1449, Yakob’s 
military invaded and colonized Massawa and the Dahlak Islands. He reorganized the area 
under one administration, the bahr negash or “ruler of the seas,”92 reopened a port 
opposite Massawa and redirected all Imperial trade there.93 By the end of Emperor 
Yakob’s reign, the Sultan of Adal thus found his hold on trade in the region broken.  
Emperor Yakob’s repeated victories including the occupation of the Dahlak 
Islands and Massawa captured the attention of several European powers. In 1450, Adal 
watched as Emperor Yakob sent a mission to Europe that resulted in European technical 
assistance to Yakob’s kingdom, further entrenching its power in the region.94 Thus by 
1450, the Ethiopian Empire had forced Adal into near subservience and taken control of 
trade from Muslim principalities south, east and north of the Empire’s original 
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boundaries. Despite the continual defeats of the Muslims at the hands of the Ethiopian 
Empire and the apparent strength of the Solomonic dynasty at the time of Emperor 
Yakob’s death in 1468, however, only sixty years later a self-declared imam would 
mobilize a broad-based Muslim army effective enough to take control of Ethiopia and 
hold it for over a decade. Several persons would play a role in the decline of the 
Ethiopian Empire and the rise of the Adalite Sultanate, particularly the next Emperor and 
Sultan and Emperor Yakob’s widow, Empress Eleni (Helena).  
C.  EMPRESS HELENA, SULTAN MUHAMMAD AND ACCOMMODATION 
Worn down by constant struggle with Ethiopia, conservative elements in the 
Adalite Sultanate, represented by Sultan Muhammad ibn Badlay (r. 1488-1518), sent a 
delegation to Emperor Yakob’s successor, Baeda Maryam (r. 1468-78), seeking a truce to 
counter the royal policy of repressing the power of the Muslims along the coast. The 
Emperor turned to his chief adviser Empress Helena, Emperor Yakob’s widow, for 
advice. Helena, one of the most important women in Ethiopian history, lived from 1430 
into the 1520’s serving as adviser to three Emperor’s after her husband (as “Queen 
Mother” to Emperor Maryam and later Regent).95 She had reason to support the Muslim 
request. She was the daughter of the ruler of Hadeya (see Figure 4), a Muslim territory 
under the Emperor’s control, so she had grown up Muslim. After marrying the Christian 
Emperor, she had risen in favor in his eyes and came to called “Queen of the Right,” but 
she had also lived to see her Muslim brother beheaded for leading a rebellion in Hadeya 
against her husband.96 Through all this she remained aware of the wider Muslim world, 
including Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula (which will become important later in this 
story), and she sought to achieve good commercial relations between the Empire and 
Sultan Muhammad.97 This is not to say, however, that she did not support the Empire’s 
goal of controlling trade, as will become clear. 
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Thus, it was that after consulting with Helena, Emperor Maryam agreed to an 
accommodation with Muhammad.98 This may have been a political mistake for both 
leaders. First, for Sultan Muhammad the Muslim-Christian accommodation incensed the 
more militant, independence-minded forces in his sultanate. These forces, now influenced 
by clerics from the Arabian Peninsula, set out to undermine any accommodation. The 
accommodation also was dangerous for the Christians. The Solomonic Empire was not a 
strong state but rather a feudal, conglomerate state consisting of a core community in the 
northern-central highlands (stretching from Tigrai south through Amhara to northern 
Shawa – see Figure 4) who shared cultural, linguistic, and religious affinities. Around this 
area were recently conquered provinces of at least superficially Christian people living 
under administrations much like the core’s. Beyond that were tributary states that 
included the Muslim provinces we have discussed that were culturally, religiously and 
economically different from the core highland communities. In short the people of 
Ethiopia remained focused on their local communities, rarely considering the state other 
than when it called for payment of taxes. Holding the state together thus required strong, 
and at times authoritarian, rule.99  
The accommodation signaled weakness to many of the Imperial provinces and to 
the more radical elements in Adal and encouraged rebellion once again. Despite a long 
history of proving the unfortunate need for authoritarian rule in such a fractured Empire, 
Empress Helena, attuned to the Muslim tributary principalities, believed the government 
of these areas should be small. Baeda Maryam obliged and made government even 
smaller by neglecting the machinery of his central administration. Instead of using his 
father’s well-known supporters in local leadership positions, for example, he allowed 
local families, clans, and dynasties to rule. Furthermore, he reinstituted the traveling 
capital in which his court would pursue tribute rather than insisting it be delivered to his 
central government.100 This was not completely unusual since medieval Ethiopia lacked 
permanent cities and large villages and in general the Emperor’s capital was not fixed but 
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consisted of temporary residences at military camps.101 Trade was not extensive enough 
to allow mercantile towns to grow with the exception of a small number of settlements on 
the trade routes. Thus, Emperor Maryam’s court and armies would travel with him and 
live off the illiterate, poor peasants.102 Because Christians were generally subsistence 
farmers who could trade only the little surplus they did not need to survive, these roving 
armies were more like pestilence than protectors which surely instilled resentment and 
further weakened the Emperor’s rule.103 
D.  THE SULTANATE OF ADAL AND AMIR MAHFUZ 
Sensing the weakening of the Christian Empire, Muslim elements preaching in 
support of holy war, or jihad, began to surface in support of various Muslim military 
leaders (“amirs”) in the Sultanate of Adal who refused to settle into a truce with an 
Empire that had taken their territory and trade routes. While Sultan Muhammad remained 
nominally in charge of Adal, increasing popular support for the amirs initiated a shift in 
political power away from those who sought moderation in relations with the Christian 
Empire. A turning point in the political power of the amirs was reached when Amir Ladai 
Uthman, governor of Zeila, is said to have begun preparation for war with Ethiopia in 
1471. As in the past, the Christian Emperor took the offensive against Uthman and routed 
the Adalites yet again. The Emperor’s forces rounded up many of the radical amirs, but 
the revolt was still not contained.104  
As revolt continued across the empire, the central administration weakened 
allowing local leaders and tributary states to retain more of their local revenue. The 
beleaguered Muslim principalities increasingly avoided paying tribute and a percentage 
of trading profits to the hated Emperor. The various Muslim states shown in Figure 4 
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grew stronger as Emperor Maryam’s garrisons pulled back or fell into disrepair.  In the 
highlands the Emperor’s neglect led to Christian heterodoxy and social strife as the 
central axis of the state, the alliance between the crown and the clergy, weakened. Under 
these conditions, Adal’s relative military strength grew until the Adalite armies were able 
to defeat the Emperor’s armies when they invaded Adal in 1473/4 C.E.105 There then 
followed a period of constant raids by the amirs into Ethiopia.106  
Maryams’s successor Iskinder continued campaigns in Dawaro and Bali begun by 
Maryam. In another campaign, he sacked the capital of Adal, but upon his return journey, 
his troops were overwhelmed by an Adalite army.  Iskinder ultimately died in another 
battle and was succeeded by Emperor Naod (1494-1508). Meanwhile in Adal, Sultan 
Muhammad ibn Azhar ad-Din (1488-1518) sought peace with Ethiopia. He could not, 
however, control the Amir of Harar, Mahfuz, whose forces ran regular raids into Christian 
territories during Lent.107 Although Mahfuz’ raids did not lead to devastating 
consequences, they did create considerable stress for the Christians.108 Emperor Naod 
decided to take matters into his own hands by attacking and defeating Mahfuz although 
he did not kill him. Sultan Muhammad quickly sought a truce. The truce uneasily held for 
some time despite Mahfuz’s less frequent but continued raids.109  
During the time of Naod, Helena continued to advise the Emperor. In the 
continuing struggle over trade, Emperor Naod, on Helena’s advice sought an alliance 
with the European Christian power Portugal which, having recently discovered the 
passage to India via the Cape of Good Hope, was now operating nearby in the Indian 
Ocean.110 The Portuguese at this time were seeking to gather allies to fight the Muslim 
powers controlling the Indian Ocean and Red Sea, as part of their drive to become the 
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principle sea power controlling trade from these waters with Europe.111 In 1494, a 
Portuguese envoy suggested Emperor Naod’s interests would best be served by Portugal 
occupying the commercial centers on the Red Sea coast to cut off the sultanates in the 
region from the outside Muslim world particularly the Arabian Peninsula.112 Portuguese 
efforts to affect this strategy, however, were delayed until several years later, a fact of no 
small consequence as we shall see later.  
Thus, by the end of the 15th century, the Empire’s expansion north combined with 
its “divide and rule” tactics against the Walashma family had successfully broken Adal’s 
control on trade and driven Adal to seek peace with the Ethiopian Empire. The resultant 
accommodation diminished Sultan Muhammad’s power and encouraged militancy in 
Adal and rebellion throughout the Empire. In the coming years, Muslim forces under new 
leadership in Adal would finally unite, fight back and for a decade not only gain their 
independence but also take over the highland Christian kingdoms that had held them in 
subjugation for so long. 
E.  THE EMPIRE DEFEATS AMIR MAHFUZ OF ADAL 
When Emperor Naod died, his eleven year old son Lebna Dengel (r. 1508-1540) 
took the throne. Due to the Emperor’s youth, Empress Helena was named Regent.113 
Considering its continuing internal rot, the Christian Empire was fortunate that the 
experienced Empress Helena was available to hold the Empire together. In the early days 
of Lebna Dengel’s reign, Empress Helena reached out to Portugal recognizing her uneasy 
truce with Adal would not hold.114 In the short term, she did maintain peace with Adal 
and some prosperity followed.115 During this time, Lebna Dengel came of age, and 
despite Helena’s efforts, rejected further accommodations with Adal.  
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The rebellious Amir Mahfuz, who like Lebna Dengel wished to see no 
accommodations between the Emperor and Adal, had by this time recovered from his 
defeat at the hands of Emperor Naod’s forces and had gained de facto rule of Adal. 
Encouraged by Arabian emissaries preaching jihad, he had renewed his raids into 
Ethiopia.116 Among the leaders of the medieval Muslim principalities we have 
considered, Amir Mahfuz was the first (Gran would be the last) to practice what had been 
preached to him by Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula whose message of holy war, or 
jihad, was being shaped by important events occurring in the Middle East as they 
preached.117 In the Middle East, a revival of Islam was aiding in political unification of 
various Islamic groups. The energies unleashed by this political unification were in some 
cases directed into external jihadi efforts -- the Ottomans fought in Europe, the Persian 
Safavids in the Caucasus, and the Mamluks in the Red Sea against the Portuguese.118  
The awakening of Islamic fervor in Arabia led holy men and members of 
important Arab families linked by lineage to the Prophet Muhammad to migrate to Harar 
and other Islamic principalities in the Horn of Africa between 1490 and 1540. These 
migrants came primarily from the Hadrawmat area and also from Yemen and Hijaz. They 
had their greatest influence in Harar, by then an established Islamic center of learning and 
the only urban diffusion point for Islam in Adal during the medieval period. In Harar, this 
new religious spirit helped marginalize Sultan Muhammad as militant religious leaders 
took the reins of power. Amir Mahfuz (and later his son-in-law, Gran) exemplified this 
new form of religiously fervent political leadership. Amir Mahfuz declared himself an 
imam, flew holy flags, and placed in his camp Arabian tents that signified holy-war.119 
Once again a challenger to Imperial domination emboldened the Adalites to rebel. In 
1516, Amir Mahfuz’s forces invaded the highlands, but Mahfuz was killed in an ambush 
by Emperor Dengel’s army. Dengel then proceeded to invade Adal, destroying Sultan  
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Muhammad’s castle while a Portuguese fleet attacked Zeila, Amir Mahfuz’s base, and 
burned it.120 Thus by 1520, Lebna Dengel had turned Empress Helena’s and Sultan 
Muhammad’s policy of accommodation on its head.  
Lebna Dengel returned from his lowland victory to a hero’s welcome, feeling 
emboldened. When the Portuguese arrived in 1520 (in response to Empress Helena’s 
request some years earlier), offering to help fortify the defenses of the Christian empire, 
Lebna Dengel failed to achieve any agreement with them. Though he engaged in a period 
of relatively intense diplomatic efforts aimed at encouraging the Portuguese to take over 
the port at Zeila and thereby control trade in and out of the Muslim territories, Emperor 
Dengel believed that he had subdued the Muslim challenge to the empire. He ultimately 
sent the Portuguese home with no concrete results. This was a serious mistake.121 Even 
as the Portuguese were withdrawing in 1526, Ahmad Gran, a military commander in 
Adal, was winning his first a battle against an Ethiopian expedition, signaling a turning 
point.122  
F.  THE RISE OF IMAM GRAN OF ADAL 
Emperor Dengel’s resounding defeat of the Adalite forces, the death of Amir 
Mahfuz and the burning of Zeila by Portugal of course set the militant amirs of Adal at 
even stronger odds with the conservative elements still calling for peace with the 
Emperor. In 1518, Sultan Muhammad was murdered, and thereafter five sultans rose and 
fell in a two-year period.123  
During this time of intense turmoil in Adal, Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi 
(1506-43), nicknamed by the Ethiopians “Gran” (“the left-handed”), rose to prominence 
in Harar.124  Likely established by Meccan immigrants, Harar attracted Islamic scholars, 
Sufi mystics and ashraf (important family members claiming direct descent from 
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Muhammad).125 Like Amir Mahfuz before him and like people in and around Harar, Gran 
was heavily influenced by a wave of scholars beginning to arrive from the Arabian 
Peninsula in the 1490’s. He would later use these scholars as leaders of the peasants and 
nomads that formed his army. For their part, these scholars hoped to obtain religious and 
legal leadership posts in a post-conquest Ethiopia.126  
Gran was supported by Muslim powers outside Adal. The Amir of Mecca gave 
Gran his blessings, signified by the presentation of the green flags of Islamic holy war.127 
In addition, the Ottomans provided Adal many of the cannons and firearms Gran would 
use.128 The Ottoman occupation of Egypt in 1517, and the Ottomans ongoing drive to 
unite the Middle East and gain control of the Red Sea coasts and Yemen further 
emboldened the Adalite militants.129 
Spiritually, Gran had acquired his jihadi beliefs while fighting for Sultan Jared 
Abun of Adal (r. ca. 1522-1525). Sultan Abun had used a focus on Islamic purity as a 
means of pulling together the divided people in his charge.130 Thus, when the Sultan was 
assassinated and Gran watched leaders rise and fall in rapid succession in Adal, Gran 
became repulsed by secular Muslim rule. He traveled out into the countryside and began 
preaching a powerful, charismatic message. He proclaimed himself an imam and began 
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have claimed Gran as one of their own, his ethnic origins are unknown. He may have 
been Arab.132 He operated militarily out of an area due south of present-day Djibouti 
along the southern border of northwest Somalia.133   
After building an army, Gran returned to the area of Harar and gained the support 
of the jihadi followers of Amir Mahfuz (earlier killed by Lebna Dengel) by marrying 
Mahfuz’s daughter. He killed the secular Sultan Abu Baker, with whom he had shared the 
region for some time, and installed the Sultan’s brother as a puppet thus gaining full 
control of Adal. His rise occurred at a strategic moment. First, the Ethiopian state was 
weakened. During the Empire’s rapid expansion south, it had over extended itself and 
efforts to integrate new areas organizationally and ideologically had failed. Second, 
Muslim sentiment was aroused by Portuguese successes in the Red Sea and Portuguese 
interest in Ethiopia. Third, the Ottomans, who had taken over Egypt in 1517 and Yemen 
in 1525, now openly supported Imam Gran both morally and militarily.134 Fourth, all the 
people in the Adalite Sultanate, including the Danakils, Afars and Somalis now felt 
economically deprived compared to their relatively well-off highland neighbors.135 Fifth 
and finally, preaching against the payment of tribute inspired rebellion. In the view of the 
resident Arabian scholars, paying tribute to a non-Muslim made a Muslim inferior and 
separated him from the core of the Islamic community. Payment of tribute meant 
humiliation because it suggested the person, as one part of the entire Muslim community, 
was held in pledge. Thus, the requirement of tribute was considered dishonorable and 
debasing not only to the individual but to the Islamic community. The community was 
therefore compelled to resist thereby making resistance, in principle, the Amir’s or 
Sultan’s most important function.136 
                                                 
132 Marcus, 31; I.M. Lewis, “The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa,” The Journal of African 
History, 1 (1960): 223; Erlich, 1994: 30. 
133 Trimingham, 1952: 85. 
134 Kapteijns, 229; Esposito, 501. 
135 Martin, 1975: 97. 
136 Davis, 1964: 127. 
 34
G. IMAM GRAN CONQUERS THE ETHIOPIAN EMPIRE 
Capitalizing on all these factors and having consolidated his power in Adal, Imam 
Gran openly encouraged war with Ethiopia by refusing tribute.137 When the Ethiopian 
army invaded Adal in 1527, Gran’s forces handed the Emperor a defeat. Imam Gran’s 
army remained a shaky coalition of tribes under Somali chiefs who were still used to the 
raider cycle of battle, that is victory, looting and disappearing. Thus, despite his victory, 
Gran had to return to the Somali territory, restore order and stir up jihadi fervor in his 
troops.138  
Even during this time in which the strongest theoretical argument can be made 
that the Christians were beleaguered by Muslims, Adalite Muslims resisted a direct 
assault on Ethiopia. One group counseled Gran:  
Neither your fathers, nor your ancestors, nor the amirs ‘Ali and Mahfuz, 
your father in law, nor Jarad Ibrahim and the former sultans of the Land of 
Sa’d ad-Din, dared attack the King of Abyssinia [Ethiopia] in his own 
homeland, but merely raided over the borders, took booty and returned, 
and if one of the infidels pursued them they fought to retain what they had 
taken. Yet you want to attack the King of Abyssinia [Ethiopia] in his own 
country. Take care you do not bring destruction upon the Muslims.139  
This is an important comment in relation to the image of the Muslim menace to Ethiopia. 
The statement reinforces what we have seen: that Muslim forces ran raids into territories 
administered by the Emperor, but they never posed a threat of overthrowing the Christian 
kingdoms. Such evidence, in conjunction with the evidence of the Ethiopian’s continual 
military campaigns against its Muslim neighbors, serves to support the notion that 
Muslim-Christian conflicts in the medieval period were primarily driven by Ethiopian, 
not Muslim, expansionism. 
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Despite such misgivings about taking on the Emperor and despite Gran’s force of 
Somali pastoral nomads who were unaccustomed to working together in common cause, 
by 1531 Gran had reconstructed his forces and was able to begin a full invasion of the 
Christian kingdoms of the Ethiopian Empire.140 After centuries of Imperial expansion 
and subjugation, Gran’s forces finally set out to truly beleaguer the Christian fortress. 
They took the peripheral states of Bali, Sidamo, Hadeya, and Kambata (see Figure 4 in 
the south of the “Areas under Christian control”) and moved north to occupy Dawaro and 
Shawa. Within four years the south and center of the Ethiopian highlands had been 
conquered. Then, Gran’s forces headed further north to Amhara, Lasta and Tigrai (see 
Figure 4) and all the way to what is today the border of Sudan.141 Along the way, Gran 
constructed a civil administration with his religious leaders at the helm.142  
H.  THE EMPIRE DEFEATS IMAM GRAN  
Emperor Lebna Dengel’s army had hardly been beleaguered at first. It was huge, 
drawing troops from Tigrai, Amhara, Agaw, Bagemder, Gojjam and Shawa (see Figure 
4). Defense was complicated, however, by the inefficiencies of such a behemoth army. 
Logistics were poor and complicated by power struggles between officers, which 
undermined the development of a common strategy. In contrast, Gran’s reconstituted 
forces were unified in command, mobile because they were smaller in number and had 
better armaments thanks to their direct access to Red Sea trade.143 Nevertheless, despite 
their weaknesses the Christians had managed to hold the port at Massawa, and in 1535, 
Emperor Dengel, while on the run, managed to send for help from Portugal.144 The King 
of Portugal obliged, but by the time his ships carrying four hundred musketeers arrived at 
Massawa, six years had passed and Emperor Dengel had been killed by Gran’s forces.145 
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Nevertheless, the Portuguese arrival was important for around this same time the 
governor of Tigrai was able to rebuild his army and join up with the forces of the new 
Ethiopian Emperor, Galawdewos (r. 1540-1559). The Portuguese were then able to train 
these forces in European war-fighting tactics.146  
In 1542, in his first battle against Galawdewos’ army, Gran was defeated near 
Lake Tana between Amhara and Gojjam (Figure 3).147 Wounded, he pulled back to a 
refuge in the mountains and sent for Arab, Turkish and Albanian mercenary 
reinforcements. Turkey, now the leader of the Middle East and a fierce competitor with 
Portugal in the Indian Ocean, did not want Portugal wading into Ethiopian affairs and 
therefore provided Gran with cannons and musketeers. Gran turned the tide for a while 
by killing the Portuguese commander.148 Believing the Emperor’s forces no longer 
constituted a threat, however, Gran unwisely sent the Turkish forces home and returned 
to his headquarters at Lake Tana.149 On 25 February 1543, Galawdewos’ forces attacked 
Gran’s forces again at Lake Tana and killed Gran. As soldiers on both sides had done for 
centuries in this region, Gran’s troops fled the battlefield, and his conquest was reversed 
faster than it had been won.150 The Ethiopian army paraded Gran’s severed head, and by 
1555, they had restored the original boundaries of the Empire.  
Beaten down by the devastating effects of Gran’s conquest, Christians and 
Muslims remained for some time generally content to remain within their own 
territories.151 The Ottomans even formed long-lasting relations with Christian 
Ethiopia.152 Meanwhile, Gran became a hero to Muslims in the Horn of Africa, having 
stood up to the powerful Ethiopian Empire.153 Gran’s capital of Harar was reduced for 
some time from a central diffusion point of Islam and a strong trading center to a town 
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struggling to avoid extinction.154 His nephew, Nur ibn Mujahid Nur, fought back against 
the Christian Emperor but ultimately retreated to Harar surrounding the city with 
defensive walls. In subsequent years, Harar was besieged by Christian forces and by 
Oromo tribes from the southwest. Today, Harar remains the only solely Islamic city in 
Ethiopia. Protected by fortress-like walls, it is a symbol of Islam’s place in Ethiopian 
history, truly a beleaguered Muslim fortress in a sea of historical inaccuracy.155  
                                                 
154 Erlich, 2007: 20-21. 
155 Kapteijns, 230; Esposito, 502; Henze, 87; Erlich, 2007: 19-20; Braukamper, 2002: 109; Abir, 
1975: 537-541. 
 38
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 39
IV. CONCLUSION 
As I noted in Chapter I, J.S. Trimingham has described “the Christian state in 
northern Ethiopia” as “a beleaguered fortress in the midst of a sea of Islam” suggesting 
the Ethiopian Christian Empire was under siege by its Muslim neighbors.156 As we have 
seen, however, the Ethiopian Empire of the medieval period was hardly beleaguered by 
its Muslim neighbors. Instead, the Ethiopian Emperors were on the attack almost 
constantly against their Muslim neighbors. The Muslim-controlled trade routes that ran 
through the Christian kingdoms of the Empire were the target of Imperial want. The 
Emperors of Ethiopia, however, wanted more than control of trade in the core Christian 
kingdoms. They wanted control of the trade routes running through the Muslim sultanates 
to the Empire’s south. Emperor Seyon took them. They wanted control of the trade routes 
controlled by Ifat. Emperor Seyon and Emperor Arad took them. They wanted control of 
the routes in Adal and control of the Port of Zeila. When Adal resisted, Emperor Dawit I 
invaded Adal and pushed all the way to the Port of Zeila. When the Empire found it could 
not hold Adal due to its size, Emperor Yakob’s troops invaded the Islamic strip north of 
Tigrai, took over Massawa and the Dahlak Islands and rerouted all highland trade there in 
an effort to destroy the importance of Adal’s Port of Zeila.  
While physically beleaguering their Muslim neighbors, the Emperors also 
besieged them politically by pursuing a policy of creating internal division with the 
leadership of the Muslim sultanates, particularly the Walashma family of Ifat and later 
Adal. As we have seen, this tactic did weaken the Empire’s Muslim neighbors but also 
sowed the seeds of unified Islamic rebellion. 
In the retelling of Ethiopian medieval history, historians have made much of 
Islamic incursions into the Ethiopian highlands. Imam Gran’s conquest of most of the 
Christian kingdoms in the highlands is the conflict about which historians covering 
medieval Ethiopia have written the most. An unbalanced focus on this violent, albeit 
short-lived, Islamic conquest has undoubtedly done more to ingrain this image of the 
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“beleaguered” Christians than anything else. In this thesis, however, I have shown that 
the jihads of Imam Gran and Amir Mahfuz before him were reactions to the expansionary 
policies of the Empire that continually subjugated its neighbors. Thus, despite these 
ostensibly offensive Muslim attempts to lay siege to the medieval Empire, the military 
actions of Muslim forces against the Ethiopian Empire were in reality defensive. Thus, 
one can safely say that if any group was beleaguered in the medieval period, it was the 
disparate Muslim principalities that found themselves continually subjugated, often 
brutalized by Ethiopian forces and forced to watch as the Christians emplaced garrisons 
throughout the sea of Islam.   
This is not to say, however, that the Muslims were never a threat to the Christians. 
Indeed one would have to ignore Imam Gran’s 16th century victory to come to such a far-
reaching conclusion. Yet, the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries appear devoid of any period 
where Muslim powers posed a serious threat of violently taking over the Christian 
Empire. On the other hand, throughout that time period, the Christian Emperors, 
particularly Amda Seyon and Zara Yakob, expanded their control over their Muslim 
neighbors and conflicts grew. It is in these times that historians have suggested Islamic 
forces posed a violent threat. This is puzzling for if the Muslims posed such a threat when 
the Christian Empire was effectively consolidated, why did the Muslims fail to conquer 
the kingdoms prior to Imperial consolidation? Would that not have been the time for 
conquest if they were so disposed? Why in the retelling of Ethiopian history does the 
purported threat of the Muslim sea seem to rise in intensity precisely when the 
consolidation of Christian power occurs? The answer is fairly straightforward: the 
Muslim threat of violence rose as the Empire increasingly subjected the Muslim 
sultanates to violence, taxes and loss of control of trade. The Muslim sultanates were a 
threat to the Ethiopians not because they wanted to overthrow Christian territory but 
because they desired to reclaim their own territory, trade routes and independence. This 
desire in turn drove the Muslims to finally consolidate their power leading to the 
temporary victory of Imam Gran. In short, the Muslim polities were themselves a 
collection of beleaguered not-so-well-fortified fortresses.  
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In fact, the evidence suggests that Muslims were usually the opposite of a threat. 
Except for scattered rebellions and raids (which were also occurring between Christian 
states and between Muslim states), the various Muslim neighbors of Ethiopia were an 
integral part of the success of the highland Empire in the medieval period. This was seen 
through the presence of Muslims in the Emperor’s court and camp, the entrusting of the 
Emperor’s money to them for trade, their development of the trade routes, their 
relationships in the Middle East which made it possible for the Ethiopians to trade in that 
area, their presence even in the Emperor’s armies, and the list goes on. If one concedes 
the contributions of Muslims in times of peace, however, what does one make of Imam 
Gran’s war? Should one say, “Ah-ha. There is the proof of the violent designs of the 
Muslims?” The better conclusion is that Imam Gran’s conquest of the highland territories 
was an anomaly (and therefore not proof of an overarching medieval threat to the 
Christians).  
The threat Gran posed required the coincidence of at least three factors, which did 
not occur at any other time during the medieval period. First and most importantly, Gran 
tapped into a fully-matured resentment among disparate Muslim groups in response to 
financial exaction of the Empire (i.e., taxes and tribute). Second, he exploited the 
religious mobilization achieved by individuals from the Arabian Peninsula seeking power 
in a new highland Sultanate. Third, he gained the support of more opportunistic elements 
(Somali, Afar, etc.) seeking loot. What is important to note about this confluence of 
factors, however, is that Gran’s threat was never truly actualized until the Muslim’s in 
Adal had grown receptive to the jihadi message. When did this occur? It occurred only in 
the sixteenth century after centuries of Christian expansion. Moreover, it was only fully 
successful after Gran had repeatedly demonstrated he could win battles against the 
Christians. Thus, only when he had demonstrated his effectiveness and power and only 
when he had in place a host of jihadist preachers to encourage the subjugated locals to 
join could Gran actually besiege the Christians in the highlands, and even then only for a 
short time. Accordingly, this looks less like the culmination of a continual siege upon the 
Christians than the culmination of a continual siege upon the Muslims. 
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Unfortunately, it is impossible to know how Ethiopian history would have been 
different had the Empire acted differently toward its Muslim neighbors. What if Empress 
Helena and Sultan Muhammad’s accommodation had not been undermined by internal 
forces on both sides? Perhaps Gran’s conquest would never have occurred, the Christians 
would not have suffered under Gran, the Muslims would not have been decimated in the 
end and the Muslims and the Christians together could have limited the debilitating 
Oromo migrations that followed. Perhaps not.  
In Islam in Ethiopia, Trimingham argued that the “Christian fortress” survived 
because of its unique national consciousness rooted in the Solomonid traditions and in 
spite of a constant Muslim threat.157 By controlling trade and the regions through which it 
flowed, the Emperors built their Christian fortress on a foundation of Muslim subjects. 
Thus through a combination of subjugating and taxing Muslims and at the same time 
treating them as an outside threat, the Christian fortress of Ethiopia grew and survived 
thanks to its beleaguered Muslims neighbors, rather than in spite of them. 
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